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ESSAYS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL

STRUCTURE

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- Philosophy and Politics
- Philosophy for Layman
- The Future of Mankind
- An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish
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LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to understand :

1. The essays of Bertrand Russell, such as :
 - Philosophy and politics
 - Philosophy for Layman
 - The future of mankind
 - An outline of intellectual rubbish

INTRODUCTION

I Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) was a British philosopher, I logician, essayist and social critic best known for his work in mathematical I logic and analytic philosophy. His most influential contributions include I his defense of logicism, the view that mathematics is in some important sense reducible to logic, his refining of the imply calculus introduced I by Gottlob Frege, which still forms the basis of most contemporary I logic, his defense of neutral doctrine (the view that the world consists of just one type of substance that is neither exclusively mental nor exclusively physical), and his theories of definite descriptions and logical atomism. Along with G.E. Moore, Russell is generally recognized as one of

the founders of modern analytic philosophy. Along with Kurt Godel, he is regularly credited with being one of the most important logicians of the twentieth century.

Over the course of his long career, Russell made significant contributions, not just to logic and philosophy, but to a broad range of subjects including education, history, political theory and religious studies. In addition, many of his writings on a variety of topics in both the sciences and the humanities have influenced generations of general readers.

After a life marked by controversy, including dismissals from both - Trinity College, Cambridge, and City College, New York. Russell was awarded the Order of Merit in 1949 and the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Noted for his many spirited anti-war and anti-nuclear protests, Russell remained a prominent public figure until his death at the age of 97.

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

The British are distinguished among the nations of modern Europe, on the one hand by the excellence of their philosophers, and on the other hand by their contempt for philosophy. In both respects they show their wisdom. But contempt for philosophy, if developed to the point at which it becomes systematic, is itself a philosophy; it is the philosophy which, in America, is called 'instrumentalism'. I shall that philosophy, if it is bad philosophy, may be dangerous, and therefore deserves that degree of negative respect which we accord to lightning and tigers. What positive respect may due to 'goo' philosophy I will leave for the moment an open question.

The connection of philosophy with politics, which is the subject of my lecture, has been perceptible in Britain than in Continental countries. Empiricism, broadly speaking, is connected with liberalism, but Hume was a Tory; what philosophers call 'idealism' has, in general, a similar connection with conservatism, but T.H. Green was a Liberal. On the continent distinctions have been more clear cut.

Kings, who genuinely believe in the Divine government of the world, and in a system of rewards and punishments in the next life, feel themselves not omnipotent, and not able to sin with indemnity. This feeling is expressed by the King in Hamlet, when he contrasts the inflexibility of Divine justice with the acquiescence of earthly judges to the royal power.

Philosophers, when they have tackled the problem of preserving social consistency, have sought solutions less obviously dependent upon dogma than those offered by official religions. Most philosophy has been a reaction (against skepticism; it has arisen in ages when authority no longer sufficed to produce the socially necessary minimum of belief, so that nominally rational arguments had to be invented to secure the same result. This motive has led to a deep insincerity infecting most philosophy, both ancient and modern. There has been a fear, often

unconscious, that clear thinking would lead to nihilism, and this fear has led philosophers to hide in mists of fallacy and obscurity.

There have, of course, been exceptions; the most notable are Protagoras in relic, and Hume in modern times. Both, as a result of skepticism, were politically conservative. Protagoras did not know whether the : gods existed, but he held that in any case they ought to be worshipped. Philosophy, according to him, had nothing edifying to teach, and for the survival of morals we must rely upon the thoughtlessness of the majority and their willingness to believe what they had been taught. Nothing, therefore, must be done to weaken the popular force of tradition.

The same sort of thing, up to a point, may be said about Hume. After setting forth his skeptical conclusions, which, he admits, are not such as men can live by, he passes on to a piece of practical advice which, if followed, would prevent anybody from reading him. 'Carelessness and inattention,' he says, 'alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them.' He does not, in this connection, set forth his reasons for being a Tory, but it is obvious that 'carelessness and inattention', while they may lead to accession in the status circumstance, cannot, conjointly unaided, lead a man to advocate this or that scheme of reform.

Hobbes, though less skeptical than Hume, was equally persuaded that government is not of divine origin, and was equally led, by the road of disbelief, to advocacy of extreme conservatism.

Protagoras was 'answered' by Plato, and Hume by Kant and Hegel. In each case the philosophical world heaved a sigh of relief, and refrained from examining too nicely the intellectual validity of the 'answer', which in each case had political as well as theoretical consequences -though in the case of the 'answer' to Hume it was not the Liberal Kant but the reactionary Hegel who developed the political consequences.

But thorough-going skeptics, such as Protagoras and Hume, have never been influential, and have served chiefly as bugbears to be used by reactionaries in frightening people into irrational dogmatism. The really powerful adversaries against whom Plato and Hegel had to contend were not skeptics, but quackery. Democritus in the one case and Locke in the other. In each case empiricism was associated with democracy and with a more or less serviceable ethic. In each case the new philosophy succeeded in presenting itself as nobler and more profound than the philosophy of pedestrian common sense which it supplanted. In each case, in the name of all that was most sublime, the new philosophy made itself the champion of injustice, cruelty, and opposition to progress. In the case of Hegel this has come to be more or less recognized; in the case of Plato it is still something of a paradox, though it has been brilliantly advocated in a recent book by Dr. K.R. Popper.

Plato, according to Diogenes Laetrius, expressed the view that all the books of Democritus ought to be burnt. His wish was so far fulfilled that none of the writings of Democritus survive. Plato, in his Dialogues, never mentioned him; Aristotle gave some account of his doctrines; Epicurus vulgarized him; and finally Lucretius put the doctrines of Epicurus into verse. Lucretius just survived, by a happy accident. To reconstruct Democritus from the controversy of Aristotle and the poetry of Lucretius is not easy; it is almost as if we had to reconstruct Plato from Locke's refutation of innate ideas and Vaughan's 'I saw eternity the other night'. Nevertheless enough can be done to explain and condemn Plato's hatred.

Democritus is chiefly famous as (along with Leucippus) the founder of atomism, which he advocated in spite of the objections of metaphysicians - objections which were repeated by their successors down to and including Descartes and Leibniz. His atomism, however, was only part of his general philosophy. He was a materialist, a determinist, a free thinker, a serviceable who disliked all strong passions, a believer in evolution, both astronomical and biological.

Like the men of similar opinions in the eighteenth century, Democritus was an fervid democrat. 'Poverty in a democracy,' he says, 'it as much to be preferred to what is called prosperity under totalitarian as freedom is to slavery'. He was a contemporary of Socrates and Protagoras, and a fellow-townsmen of the latter; he flourished during the early years of the Peloponnesian war, but may have died before it ended. That war concentrated the struggle that was taking place throughout the Hellenic world between democracy and coercion. Sparta stood for coercion; so did Plato's family and friends, who were thus led to become fraternizer. Their treachery is held to have contributed to the defeat of Athens. After that defeat, Plato set to work to sing the praises of the victors by constructing a Utopia of which the main features were suggested by the constitution of Sparta. Such, however, was his artistic skill that Liberals never noticed his reactionary tendencies until his disciples Lenin and Hitler had supplied them with practical exegesis.

That Plato's Republic should have been admired, on its political side, by decent people, is perhaps the most astonishing example of literary snobbery in all history. Let us consider a few points in this totalitarian tract. The main purpose of education, to which everything else is subordinated, is to produce courage in battle. To this end, there is to be a rigid censorship of the stories told by mothers and nurses to young children; there is to be no reading of Homer, because that degraded versifier makes heroes lament and gods laugh; the drama is to be forbidden, because it contains villains and women; music is to be only of certain kinds, which, in modern times, would be 'Rule Britannia' and 'The British Grenadiers'. The government is to be in the hands of a small coercion, who are to practice trickery and lying - trickery in manipulating the drawing of lots for dysgenics purposes, and

aware of a Cape-Horn thought. It really does have such a thought, or rather such an aspect of the one thought that it timelessly thinks and is, and this is the only reality that belongs to Cape Horn. But since we cannot reach such heights, we are doing our best in thinking of it in the ordinary geographical way.

But what, some one may say, has all this to do with politics? At first sight, perhaps, not very much. To Hegel, however, the connection is obvious. It follows from his metaphysic that true liberty consists in obedience to an arbitrary authority, that free speech is an evil, that absolute monarchy is good, that the Prussian state was the best existing at the time when he wrote, the war is good, and that an international organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes would be a misfortune. It is just possible that some of my readers may not see at once how these consequences follow, so I hope I may be pardoned for saying a few words about the intermediate steps.

Although time is unreal, the series of appearances which constitutes history has a curious relation to Reality. Hegel discovered the nature of Reality by a purely logical process called the 'dialectic', which consists of discovering contradictions in abstract ideas and correcting them less abstract. Each of these abstract ideas is conceived as a stage in the development of 'The Idea', the last stage being the 'Absolute Idea'.

Oddly enough, for some reason which Hegel never divulged, the temporal process of history repeats the logical development of the dialectic. It might be thought, since the metaphysic professes to apply to all Reality that the temporal process which parallels it would be cosmic, but not a bit of it; it is purely terrestrial, confined to recorded history, and (incredible as this may seem) to the history that Hegel happened to know. Different nations, at different times, have embodied the stages of the Idea that the dialect had reached at those studies. Of China, Hegel knew only that it was, therefore China illustrated the category of mere being. Of India he knew only that Buddhists believed in Nirvana, therefore India illustrated the category of nothing. The Greeks and Romans got rather further along the list of categories, but all the late stages have been left to the Germans, who, since the time of the fall of Rome, have been the sole standard-bearers of the Idea, and had already in 1830 very nearly realized the Absolute Idea.

To any one who still cherishes the hope that man is a more or less rational animal, the success of this farrago of nonsense must be astonishing. In his own day, his system was accepted by almost all academically educated young Germans, which is perhaps definable by the fact that it flattered German self-esteem. What is more surprising is its success outside Germany. When I was young, most teachers of philosophy in British and American universities were Hegelians, so that, until I read Hegel, I supposed there must be some truth in his system; I was cured,

however, by discovering that everything he said on the philosophy of mathematics was plain nonsense.

Most curious of all was his effect on Marx, who took over some of his most fanciful tenets, more particularly the belief that history develops according to a logical plan, and is concerned, like the purely abstract dialectic, to find ways of avoiding- self-contradiction. Over a large part of the earth's surface you will be liquidated if you question this dogma, and eminent Western men of science, who sympathise politically with Russia, show their sympathy by using the word 'contradiction' in ways that no self-respecting logician can accept.

In tracing a connection between the politics and the metaphysics of a man like Hegel, we must content ourselves with certain very general features of his practical programme. That Hegel glorified Prussia was something of an accident; in his earlier years he ardently admired Napoleon, and only became a German patriot when he became an employee of the Prussian State. Even in the latest form of his philosophy of History, he still mentions Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon as men great enough to have a right to consider themselves exempt from the obligations of the moral law. What is philosophy constrained him to admire was not Germany as against France, but order, system, regulation, and intensity of governmental control his deification of the State would have been just as shocking if the State concerned had been Napoleon's despotism. In his own opinion, he knew what the world needed, though most men did not; a strong government might compel never do. Heraclitus, to whom Hegel was deeply indebted, says: 'Every beast is driven to the pasture with blows. Let us, in any case, make sure of the blows; whether they lead to a pasturage is a matter of minor importance - except, of course, to the 'beasts'.

It is obvious that an autocratic system, such as that advocated by; Hegel or by Marx's present day disciples, is only theoretically justifiable on a basis of unquestioned dogma. If you know for certain what is the purpose of the universe in relation to human life, what is going to happen, and what is good for people even if they do not think so; if you can say, as Hegel does, that his theory of history is 'a result which happens to be known to me, because I have traversed the entire field' - then you will feel that no degree of oppression is too great, provided it leads to the goal. The only philosophy that affords a theoretical justification of democracy and that accord with democracy in its temper of mind is empiricism. Locke, who may be regarded, so far as the modern world is concerned, as the founder of doctrine, makes it clear how closely this is connected with his views on liberty and toleration, and with his opposition to absolute monarchy. He is never tired of emphasizing the uncertainty of most of our knowledge, not with a skeptical intention such as Hume's, but the intention making men aware that they may be mistaken, and that they should take account of this possibility in all their dealings with men of opinions different from their own. He had seen the evils wrought, both

by the 'enthusiasm' of the sectaries, and by the dogma of divine right of kings; to both he opposed a gradually and patchwork political doctrine, to be tested at each point by its success in practice.

What may be called, in a broad sense, the Liberal theory of politics is a periodic product of commerce. The first known example of it was in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, which lived by trading with Egypt and Lydia. When Athens, in the time of Pericles, became commercial, the Athenians became Liberal. After a long eclipse, Liberal ideas revived in the Lombard cities of the Middle Ages, and triumphed in Italy until they were extinguished by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century. But the Spaniards failed to reconquer Holland or to vanquish England, and it was these countries that were the champions of Liberalism and the leaders in commerce in the seventeenth century. In our day the leadership has passed to the United States.

The reasons for the connection of commerce with Liberalism are obvious. Trade brings men into contact with tribal customs different from their own, and in so doing destroys the dogmatism of the untraveled. The relation of buyer and seller is one of negotiation between two parties who are both free; it is most profitable when the buyer or seller is able to understand the point of view of the other party. There is, of course, imperialistic commerce where men are found to buy the point of the sword; but this is not the kind that generates Liberal philosophies, which have flourished best in trading cities that have wealth without much military strength. In the present day, the nearest analogue to the commercial cities of relic and the middle ages is to be found in small countries such as Switzerland, Holland and Scandinavia.

The Liberal creed, in practice, is one of live-and-live, of toleration and freedom so far as public order permits, of moderation and absence of zealotry in political programmes. Even democracy, when it becomes zealous, as it did among Rousseau's disciples in the French Revolution, ceases to be Liberal; indeed, a fanatical belief in democracy makes democratic institutions impossible, as appeared in England under Cromwell and in France under Robespierre. The genuine Liberal does not say 'this is true', he says 'I am inclined to think that under present circumstances this opinion is probably the .best'. Arid it is only in this limited and undogmatic sense that he will advocate democracy.

What has theoretical philosophy to say that is relevant to the rationality or otherwise of the Liberal outlook?

The essence of the Liberal outlook lies not in what opinions are held, but in how they are held; instead of being held pontifical, they are held tentatively, and with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment. This is the way in which opinions are held in science, as opposed to the way in which they are held in theology. The decisions of the Council of Nicaea

are still authoritative, but in science fourth-century opinions no longer carry any weight. In the USSR the dicta of Marx on dialectical materialism are so unquestioned that they help to determine the views of geneticists on how to obtain the best breed of wheat, though elsewhere it is thought that experiment is the right way to study such problems, science is factual, tentative, and indulgent; all immutable precept is unscientific. The scientific outlook, accordingly, is the intellectual counterpart of what is, in the practical sphere, the outlook of Liberalism, Locke, who first developed in detail the empiricist theory of knowledge, preached also religious toleration, representative institutions, and the limitation of governmental power by the system of checks and balance. Few of his doctrines were new, but he developed them in a weighty manner at just the moment when the English government was prepared to accept them.

Since, broadly speaking, the distant consequences of actions are more uncertain than the immediate consequences, it is seldom justifiable to embark on any policy on the ground that, though harmful in the present, it will be beneficial in the long run. This principle, like all others held by empiricists, must not be held absolutely; there are cases where the future consequences of one policy are fairly certain and very pleasant, while the present consequences of the other, though not agreeable, are easily endurable. This applies, for instance, to saving food for the winter, investing capital in machinery, and so on. But even in such cases uncertainty should not be lost sight of. During a boom there is much investment that turns out to have been unprofitable, and modern economists recognize that the habit of investing rather than consuming may easily be carried too far.

It is commonly urged that, in a war between Liberals and fanatics are sure to win, owing to their more unshakable belief in the righteousness of their cause. This belief dies hard, although all history, including that of the last few years, is against it. Fanatics have failed, over and over again, because they have attempted the impossible, or because, even when what they aimed at was possible, they were too unscientific to adopt the right means; they have failed also because they roused the hostility of those whom they wished to coerce. In every important war since 1700 the more democratic side has been victorious. This is partly because democracy and empiricism (which are intimately interconnected) do not demand a distortion of facts in the interests of theory. Russia and Canada, which have somewhat similar climatic conditions, are both interested in obtaining better breeds of wheat; in Canada this aim is pursued experimentally, in Russia by interpreting the Marxist Scripture.

Systems of dogma without empirical foundation, such as those of scholastic theology, Marxism, and fascism, have the advantage of producing a great degree of social coherence among their disciples. But they have the disadvantage of involving persecution of valuable sections of the population. Spain was ruined by the expulsion of the Jews and Moors; France suffered by the emigration of Huguenots

thus Laissez-faire meant liberty to the cabalistic class only. Russell observes that 'it had a mistaken idea of freedom: it instituted the despotism of the fortunate over the unfortunate.'

Change is one thing, progress is another. "Change" is scientific; "progress" is ethical; change is unarguable, whereas progress is a matter of controversy.

After ages during which the earth produced harmless trilobites and butterflies, evolution progressed to the point at which it generated Neros, Genghis Khans, and Hitler. This, however, is a passing nightmare; in time the earth will become again incapable of supporting life, and peace will return.

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PHILOSOPHY OF A LAYMAN

Mankind, ever since there have been civilized communities have been tackled with problems of two different kinds. On the one hand there has been the problem of mastering natural forces, of acquiring the knowledge and the skill required to produce tools and weapons and to encourage Nature in the production of useful animals and plants. This problem, in the modern world, is dealt with by science and scientific technique, and experience has shown that in order to deal with it adequately it is necessary to train a large number of rather narrow specialists.

But there is a second problem, less precise, and by some mistakenly regarded as unimportant - I mean the problem of how best to utilize our command over the forces of nature. This includes such burning issues as democracy versus dictatorship, capitalism versus socialism, international regime versus cosmopolitan nihilism anarchy, free speculation versus disciplinarian. On such issues the laboratory can give no decisive guidance. The kind of knowledge that gives most help in solving such problems is a wide survey of human life, in the past as well as in the present, and an appreciation of the sources of misery or contentment as they appear in history. It will be found that increase of skill has not, of itself, insured any increase of human happiness or wellbeing. When men first learnt to cultivate the soil, they used their knowledge to establish a cruel cult of human sacrifice. The men who first tamed the horse employed him to pillage and enslave peaceable populations. When, in the infancy of the industrial revolution, men discovered how to make cotton goods by machinery, the results were horrible: Jefferson's movement for the freeing of slaves in America, which had been on the point of success, was killed dead; child labor in England was developed to a point of appalling cruelty; and ruthless hegemony in Africa was stimulated in the hope that black men could be induced to clothe themselves in cotton goods. In our own day a

combination of scientific genius and technical skill has produced the atomic bomb, but having produced it we are all terrified, and do not know what to do with it. These instances, from widely different periods of history, show that something more than skill is required, something which may perhaps be called 'wisdom'. This is something that must be learnt, if it can be learnt, by means of other studies than those required for scientific technique. And it is something more needed now than ever before, because the rapid growth of technique has made ancient habits of thought and action more deficient than in any earlier time.

'Philosophy' means 'love of wisdom', and philosophy in this sense is what men must obtain if the new powers invented by technicians, and handed over by them to be flaunted by ordinary men and women, are not to jab mankind into an awful convulsion. But the philosophy that should be a part of general education is not the same thing as the philosophy of specialists. Not only in philosophy, but in all branches of academic study, there is a distinction between what has cultural value and what is only of professional interest. Historians may debate what happened to Sennacherib's unsuccessful expedition of 698 BC, but those who are not historians need not know the difference between it and his successful expedition three years earlier. Professional Greeks may usefully discuss a disputed reading in a play of Aeschylus, but such matters are not for the man who wishes, in spite of a busy life, to acquire some knowledge of what the Greeks achieved. Similarly the men who devote their lives to philosophy must consider questions that the general educated public does right to ignore, such as the differences between the theory of universals in Aquinas and in Duns Scotus, or the characteristics that a language must have if it is to be able, without falling into nonsense, to say things about itself. Such questions belong to the technical aspects of philosophy, and their discussion cannot form part of its contribution to general culture.

Academic education should aim at giving, as a restorative of the adeptness which increase of knowledge has made unavoidable, as much as time will permit of what has cultural value in such studies as history, literature and philosophy. It should be made easy for a young man who knows no Greek to acquire through translations some understanding, however inadequate, of what the Greeks accomplished. Instead of studying the Anglo-Saxon kings over and over again at school, some attempt should be made to give an epitome of world history; bringing the problems of our own day into relation with those of Egyptian priests, Babylonian kings, and Athenian reformers, as well as with all the hopes and despairs of the intervening centuries. But it is only of philosophy, treated from a similar point of view, that I wish to write.

Philosophy has had from its earliest days two different objects, which were believed to be closely interrelated. On the one hand, it aimed at a theoretical understanding of the structure of the world; on the other hand, it tried to discover and inculcate the best possible way of life. From Heraclitus to Hegel, or even to

Marx, it consistently kept both ends in view; it was neither purely theoretical nor purely practical, but sought- a theory of the universe upon which to base a practical ethic.

Philosophy has thus been closely related to science on the one hand, and to religion on the other. Let us consider first the relation to science. Until the eighteenth century science was included in what was commonly called 'philosophy', but since that time the word 'philosophy' has been cramped, on its theoretical side, to what is more hazardous and general in the topics with which science deals. It is often said that philosophy is unprogressive, but this is largely a verbal matter: as soon as a way is found of arriving at definite knowledge on some ancient question, the new knowledge is counted as belonging to 'science', and 'philosophy' is underprivileged of the credit. In Greek times, and down to the time of Newton, tellurian theory belonged to 'philosophy', because it was uncertain and speculative, but Newton took the subject out of the realm of the free play of conjecture, and made it one requiring a different type of skill from that which it had required when it was still open to fundamental doubts. Anaximander, in the sixth century BC, had a theory of evolution, and maintained that men are descended from fishes. This was philosophy because it was a speculation unsupported by detailed evidence, but Darwin's theory of evolution was science, because it was based on the succession of forms of life as found in fossils, and upon the distribution of animals and plants in many parts of the world. A man might say, with enough truth to justify a joke: 'Science is what we know, and philosophy is what we don't know'. But it should be added that philosophical speculation as to what we do not yet know has shown itself a valuable prelude to exact scientific knowledge. The guesses of the Pythagoreans in astronomy, of Anaximander and Empedocles in biological evolution, and of Democritus as to the atomic constitution of matter, provided the men of science in later times with hypotheses which, but for the philosophers, might never have entered their heads. We may say that, on its theoretical side, philosophy consists, at least in part, in the framing of large general conjecture which science is not yet in a position to test; but when it becomes possible to test the conjecture they become, if verified, a part of science, and cease to count as 'philosophy'.

The utility of philosophy, on the theoretical side, is not confined to speculations which we may hope to see confirmed or confuted by science within a measurable time. Some men are so impressed by what science knows that they forget what it does not know; others are so much more interested in what it does not know than in what it does that they belittle its achievements. Those who think that science is everything become smug and conceited, and decry all interest in problems not having the circumscribed definiteness that is necessary for scientific treatment. In practical matters they tend to think that skill can take the place of wisdom, and that to kill each other by means of the latest technique is more 'progressive', and therefore better, than to keep each other alive by old-fashioned

methods. On the other hand, those who pooh-pooh science revert, as a rule, to some ancient and pernicious superstition, and refuse to admit the immense increase of human happiness which scientific technique, if widely used, would make possible. Both these attitudes are to be abhor, and it is philosophy that shows the right attitude, by making clear at once the scope and the limitations of scientific knowledge.

Leaving aside, for the moment, all questions that have to do with ethics or with values, there are a number of purely theoretical questions, of perpetual and passionate interest, which science is unable to answer, at any rate at present. Do we survive death in any sense, and if so, do we survive for a time or for ever? Can mind dominate matter, or does matter completely dominate mind, or has each, perhaps, a certain limited independence? Has the universe a purpose? Or is it driven by blind necessity? Or is it a mere disarray and jumble, in which the natural laws that we think we find are only a phantasy generated by our own love of order? If there is a cosmic scheme, has life more importance in it than astronomy would lead us to suppose, or is our emphasis upon life mere provincialism and self-importance? I do not know the answer to these questions, and I do not believe that anybody else does, but I think human life would be penurious if they were forgotten, or if definite answers were accepted without adequate evidence. To keep alive the interest in such questions, and to scrutinize suggested answers, is one of the functions of philosophy.

Those who have a passion for quick returns and for an exact balance sheet of effort and reward may feel impatient of a study which cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, arrive at certainties, and which encourages what may be thought the time wasting occupation of inconclusive meditation on insoluble problems. To this view I cannot in any degree grant. Some kind of philosophy is a necessity to all but the most thoughtless, and in the absence of knowledge it is almost sure to be a silly philosophy. The result of this is that the human race becomes divided into rival groups of sectarian, each group firmly coax that its own brand of nonsense is sacred truth, while the other side's is donnish blasphemy. Arians and Catholics, Crusaders and Muslims, Protestants and disciple of the Pope, Communists and Fascists, have filled large parts of the last 1,600 years with futile strife, when a little philosophy would have shown both sides in all these disputes that neither had any good reason to believe itself in the right. Assertiveness is an enemy to peace, and an invincible barrier to democracy. In the present age, at least as much as in former times, it is the greatest of the mental impediments to human happiness.

The demand for certainty is one which is natural to man, but is nevertheless an intellectual vice. If you take your children for a picnic on a doubtful day, they will demand a peremptory answer as to whether it will be fine or wet, and be disappointed in you when you cannot be sure. The same sort of affirmation is demanded, in later life, of those who undertake to lead populations into the

When you act upon a conjecture which you know to be uncertain, your action should be such as will not have very harmful results if your conjecture is false. In the matter of the picnic, you may risk a wetting if all your party are vigorous, but not if one of them is so delicate as to run a risk of pneumonia. Or suppose you meet a Muggletonian, you will be justified in arguing with him, because not much harm will have been done if Mr Muggleton was in fact as great a man as his disciples suppose, but you will not be justified in burning him at the stake, because the evil of being burnt alive is more certain than any proposition of theology. Of course if the Muggletonians were so numerous and so zealous that either you or they must be killed the question would grow more difficult, but the general principle remains, that an uncertain conjecture cannot justify a certain evil unless an equal evil is equally certain on the opposite conjecture.

Philosophy, we said, has both a theoretical and a practice aim. It is now time to consider the latter.

Among most of the philosophers of old there was close connection between a view of the universe and a doctrine as to the best way of life. Some of them founded kinships which had a certain resemblance to the monastic orders of later times. Socrates and Plato were shocked by the sophists because they had no religious aims. If philosophy is to play a serious part in the lives of men who are not specialists, it must not cease to advocate some way of life. In doing this it is to explore to do something of what religion has done but with certain differences. The greatest difference is that there is no appeal to authority, whether that of tradition or that of a sacred book. The second important difference is that a philosopher should not attempt to establish a Church; Auguste Comte tried, but failed, as he deserved to do. The third is that more stress should be laid on the intellectual virtues than has been customary since the decay of Hellenic civilization.

There is one important difference between the ethical teachings of ancient philosophers and those appropriate to our own day. The ancient philosophers appealed to gentlemen of recreation, who could live as seemed good to them, and could even, if they chose, found an independent City having laws that personified the master's doctrines. The immense majority of modern educated men have no such freedom; they have to earn their living within the existing framework of society, and they cannot make important changes in their own way of life unless they can first secure important changes in political and economic organization. The consequence is that a man's ethical convictions have to be expressed more in political advocacy, and less in his private behavior, than was the case in old times. And a conception of a good way of life has to be a social rather than an individual conception. Even among the ancients, it was so conceived by Plato in the Republic, but many of them had a more individualistic conception of the ends of life.

With this proviso, let us see what philosophy has to say on the subject of integrity.

To begin with the intellectual virtues: The pursuit of philosophy is founded on the belief that knowledge is good, even if what is known is painful. A man impregnated with the philosophic spirit, whether a professional philosopher or not, will wish his beliefs to be as true as he can make them, and will, in equal measure, love to know and hate to be in error. This principle has a wider scope than may be apparent at first sight. Our beliefs spring from a great variety of causes: what we were told in youth by parents and school-teachers, what Powerful organizations tell us in order to make us act as they wish, what either embodies or diminishes our fears, what ministers to our self-esteem, and so on. Any one of these causes may happen to lead us to true beliefs, but is more likely to lead us in the opposite direction. Intellectual continence, therefore, will lead us to survey our beliefs closely, with a view to discovering which of them there any reason to believe true is. If we are wise, we shall apply solvent criticism especially to the beliefs that we find it most painful to doubt, and to those most likely to involve us in violent conflict with men who hold opposite but equally groundless beliefs. If this attitude could become common, the gain in shrinking the asperity of disputes would be inestimable.

There is another intellectual virtue which is that of generally or unbiased. I recommend the following exercise: When, in a sentence expressing political opinion, there are words that trigger powerful but different emotions in different readers, try restoring them by symbols, A, B, C, and so on and forgetting the particular significance of the symbols. Suppose A is England, B is Germany and C is Russia. So long as you remember what the letters mean, most of the things you will believe will depend upon whether you are English, German or Russian, which is logically irrelevant. When, in elementary algebra, you do problems about A, B and C going up a mountain, you have no emotional interest in the gentlemen concerned, and you do your best to work out the solution with impersonal correctness. But if you thought that A was yourself, B your hated rival and C the schoolmaster who set the problem, your calculations would go oblique, and you would be sure to find that A was first and C was last. In thinking about political problems this kind of emotional slant is bound to be present, and only care and practice can enable you to think as objectively as you do in the algebraic problem.

Thinking in abstract terms is of course not the only way to achieve virtuous generally; it can be achieved as well, or perhaps even better, if you can feel generalized emotions. But to most people this is difficult. If you are hungry, you will make great Endeavour, if necessary, to get food; if your children are persistence, you may feel an even greater urgency. If a friend is very hungry/unfed, you will probably exert yourself to relieve his distress, But if you hear that some millions of Indians or Chinese are in danger of death from

malnutrition, the problem is so vast and so distant that unless you have some official responsibility you probably soon forget all about it. Nevertheless, if you have the emotional capacity to feel distant evils intensely, you can achieve ethical generally through feeling. If you have not this rather rare gift, the habit of viewing practical problems abstractly as well as expressly is the best available substitute.

The inter-relation of logical and emotional generally in ethics is an interesting subject. Thou shall love thine neighbor as thyself implants emotional generally; 'virtuous statements should not contain proper names' implants logical generally. The two tenets sound vary different, but when they are examined it will be found that they are scarcely dissemble in practical purport. Benign men will prefer the traditional form; logicians may prefer the other. I hardly know which class of men is the smaller. Either form of statement, if accepted by statesmen and endured by the populations whom they represent, would quickly lead to the millennium. Jews and Arabs would come together and say 'Let us see how to get the greatest amount of good for both together, without inquiring too closely how it is distributed between us'. Obviously each group would get far more of what makes for happiness of both than either can at present. The same would be true of Hindus and Muslims, Chinese communists and adherents of Chiang Kai-shek, Italians and Yugoslavs, Russians and Western democrats. But alas! neither logic nor benevolence is to be expected on either side in any of these disputes.

It is not to be supposed that young men and women who are busy obtaining valuable specialized knowledge can spare a great deal of time for the study of philosophy, but even in the time that can easily be spared without injury to the learning of technical skills, philosophy can give certain things that will greatly increase the student's value as a human being and as a citizen. It can give a habit of exact and careful thought, not only in mathematics and science, but in questions of large practical import. It can give an impersonal breadth and scope to the conception of the ends of life. It can give to the individual a just measure of himself in relation to society, of man in the present to man in the past and in the future, and of the whole history of man in relation to the astronomical cosmos. By augmenting the objects of his thoughts it supplies an antidote to the apprehension and torments of the present, and makes possible the nearest approach to tranquility that is available to a sensitive mind in our tortured and uncertain world.

cruelty. But we, who are actors in the drama, who are entwined in the net of private affections and public hopes, can hardly take this attitude with any sincerity. True, I have heard men say that they would prefer the end of man to capitulation to the Soviet Government, and doubtless in Russia there are those who would say the same about submission to Western capitalism, But this is rhetoric with a spurious air of heroism. Although it must be regarded as inartistic dupe, it is dangerous, because it makes men less energetic in seeking ways of avoiding the holocaust that they pretend not to dread.

The second possibility, that of a reversion to barbarity, would leave open the likelihood of a gradual return to civilization, as after the fall of Rome. The sudden transition will, if it occurs, be infinitely painful to those who experience it, and for some centuries afterwards life will be hard and colourless. But at any rate there will still be a future for mankind, and the possibility of rational hope.

I think such an outcome of a really scientific world war is by no means dubious. Imagine each side in a position to destroy the chief cities and centres of industry of the enemy; imagine an almost complete effacing of laboratories and libraries, accompanied by a heavy fatality rate among men of science; imagine deprivation due to radioactive drizzle, and plague caused by bacteriological warfare: would social cohesion survive such strains? Would not prophets tell the maddened populations that their ills were wholly due to science, and that the extermination of all educated men would bring the millennium? Extreme hopes are born of extreme misery, and in such a world hopes could only be irrational. I think the great states to which we are accustomed would break up, and the scanty survivors would revert to a primitive village economy.

The third possibility that of the establishment of a single government for the whole world might be realized in various ways: by the victory of the United States in the next world war, or by the victory of the USSR, or, theoretically, by agreement. Or and I think this is the most hopeful of the nations that desire an cosmopolitan government, becoming, in the end, so strong that Russia would no longer dare to stand out. This might feasible be achieved without another world war, but it would require courageous and imaginative statesmanship in a number of countries.

There are various arguments that are used against the project of a single government of the whole world. The commonest is that the project is Utopian and impossible. Those who use this argument, like most of those who advocate a world government, are thinking of a world government brought about by agreement. I think it is plain that the

mutual suspicions between Russia and the West make it futile to hope, in any near future, for any genuine agreement. Any pretended universal authority to which both sides can agree, as things stand, is bound to be sham, like UNO. Consider the difficulties that have been confronted in the much more modest project of an cosmopolitan control over atomic energy, to which Russia will only consent if inspection is subject to the reject, and therefore a farce. I think we should admit that a world government will have to be imposed by force.

But many people will say why all this talk about a world government? Wars have occurred ever since men were organized into units larger than the family, but the human race has survived. Why should it not continue to survive even if wars go on occurring from time to time? Moreover, people like war, and will feel frustrated without it. And without war there will be no adequate opportunity for heroism or self-sacrifice.

This point of view — which is that of multitudinous elderly gentlemen, including the rulers of Soviet Russia — fails to take account of modern technical possibilities. I think civilization could probably survive one more world war, provided it occurs fairly soon and does not last long. But if there is no slowing up in the rate of discovery and invention and if it fails to exterminate the human race, is pretty certain to produce the kind of atavism to a primitive social system that I spoke of moment ago. And this will entail such an enormous diminution of population, not only by war, but by subsequent starvation and disease, that the survivors are bound to be fierce and at least for a considerable time, destitute of the qualities required for the rebuilding of civilization.

If things are allowed to drift, it is obvious that the bickering between Russia and the Western democracies will continue until Russia has a considerable store of atomic bombs and that when that time comes there will be an atomic war. In such a war, even if the worst consequences are avoided, Western Europe, including Great Britain, will be virtually obliterate. If America and the USSR survive as organized states, phonetic adjuncts of government, jejune, narrow and stupid. No individual will think, or even feel, for himself, but each will be contentedly a mere unit in the mass. A victory of Russia would, in time, make such a mentality world-wide. No doubt the complacency induced by success would ultimately lead to a relaxation of control, but the process would be slow, and the revival of respect for the individual would be doubtful. For such reasons I should view a Russian victory as an appalling disaster.

A victory by the United States would have far less drastic consequences. In the first place, it would not be a victory of the United States in segregation, but of an entente in which the other members would be able to insist upon retaining a large part of their traditional independence. One can hardly imagine the American army seizing the dons at Oxford and Cambridge and sending them to hard labour in Alaska. Nor do I think that they would accuse Mr. Attlee of machinate and compel him to fly to Moscow. Yet these are strict analogues to the things the Russian have done in Poland. After a victory of an entente led by the United States there would still be British culture, French culture, Italian culture, and (I hope) German culture; there would not, therefore, be the same dead uniformity as would result from Soviet domination.

There is another important difference, and that is, that Moscow creed is much more all-pervasive than that of Washington. In America, if you are a geneticist, you may hold whatever view of Mendalism the evidence makes you regard as the most probable; in Russia, if you a geneticist who disagrees with Lysenko, you are liable to disappear mysteriously. In America, you may write a book quashing Lincoln if you feel so inclined; in Russia, if you write a book quashing Lenin, it would not be published and you would be liquidated. If you are an American economist, you may hold, or not hold, that America is heading for a slump; in Russia, no economist dare question that an American slump is imminent. In America, if you are a Professor of Philosophy, you may be an idealist, a materialist, a pragmatist, a logical positivist, or whatever else may take your fancy; at congresses you can argue withy men whose opinions differ from yours and listeners can from a judgment as to who has the best of it. In Russia you must be a dialectical materialist, but at one time the element of materialism outweighs the element of contention, and at other times it is the other way round. If you fail to follow the developments of official metaphysics with sufficient agility, it will be the worse for you. Stalin at all times knows the truth about metaphysics, but you must not suppose that the truth this year is the same as it was last year.

In such a world intellect must fester, and even technological progress must soon come to an end.

Liberty, of the sort that communists despise, is important not only to intellectuals or to the more fortunate sections of society. Owing to its absence in Russia, the Soviet Government has been able to establish a greater degree of economic inequality than exists in Great Britain, or even in America. An oligarchy which controls all the means of publicity

can perpetrate injustices and cruelties which would be scarcely possible if they were widely known. Only democracy and free publicity can prevent the holders of power from establishing a servile state, with luxury for the few and overworked poverty for the many. This is what is being done by the Soviet Government wherever it is in secure control. There are, of course, economic inequalities everywhere, but in a democratic rule they tend to decline, whereas under an coercion has power, economic inequalities threaten to become permanent owing to the modern impossibility of successful rebellion.

I come now to the question; what should be our policy, in view of the various dangers to which mankind is exposed? To summarize the above arguments: We have to guard against three dangers: (1) the extinction of the human race; (2) a reversion to barbarism; (3) the establishment of a universal slave state, involving misery for the vast majority, and the disappearance of all progress in knowledge and thought. Either the first or second of these disasters is almost certain unless great wars can soon be brought to an end. Great wars can only be brought to an end by the concentration of armed force under a single authority. Such a concentration cannot be brought by agreement, because of the opposition of Soviet Russia, but it must be brought about somehow.

The first step—and it is one which is now not very difficult — is to convince the United States and the British Commonwealth of the absolute necessity for a military amalgamation of the world. The governments of the English-speaking nations should then offer to all other nations the option of entering into a firm Alliance, involving a pooling of military resources and mutual defence against aggressiveness. In the case of dubious nations, such as Italy, great inducements, economic and military, should be held out to produce their cooperation.

At a certain stage, when the Alliance had seized sufficient strength, any Great Power still refusing to join should be threatened with lawlessness, and, if fretful, should be regarded as a public enemy. The resulting war, if it occurred fairly soon, would probably leave the economic and political structure of the United States unscathed, and would enable the victorious Alliance to establish a monopoly of armed force, and therefore to make peace secure. But perhaps, if the Alliance were sufficiently powerful, war would not be necessary, and the grudging Powers would prefer to enter it as equals rather than, after a terrible war, submit to it as trounced enemies. If this were to happen, the world might emerge from its present dangers

without another great war, I do not see any hope of such a happy issue by any other method. But whether Russia would yield when threatened with war is a question as to which I do not proffer an opinion.

I have been dealing mainly with the despondent aspects of the present situation of mankind. It is necessary to do so, in order to cajole the world to adopt measures running counter to traditional habits of thought and entrenched predilection. But beyond the difficulties and probable tragedies of the near future there is the possibility of immeasurable good, and of greater well-being than has ever before fallen to the lot of man. This is not merely a possibility, but, if the Western democracies are firm and true, a probability. From the break-up of the Roman Empire to the present day, states have almost continuously increased in size. There are now only two fully independent states, America and Russia. The next step in this long historical process should reduce the two to one, and thus put an end to the period of organized wars, which began in Egypt some 6,000 years ago. If war can be prevented without the establishment of a grinding despotism, a weight will be lifted from the human spirit, deep collective fears will be expulsion, and as fear diminishes we may hope that cruelty also will grow less.

The uses to which men have put their increased control over natural forces are curious. In the nineteenth century they devoted themselves chiefly to increasing the numbers of *Homo sapiens*, particularly of the white variety. In the twentieth century they have, so far, pursued the exactly opposite aim. Owing to the increased productivity of labour, it has become possible to devote a larger percentage of the population to war. If atomic energy were to make production easier, the only effect, as things are would be make wars worse, since fewer people would be needed for producing necessities. Unless we can cope with the problem of abolishing war, there is no reason whatever to rejoice in labour saving technique, but quite the reverse. On the other hand, if the danger of war were removed, scientific technique could at last be used to promote human happiness. There is no longer any technical reason for the tenacious of poverty, even in such densely populated countries as India and China. If war no longer occupied men's thoughts and energies, we could, within a generation, put an end to all serious poverty throughout the world.

I have spoken of liberty as a good, but it is not an absolute good. We all recognize the need to impede murderers, and it is even more important to impede murderous states. Liberty must be limited by law,

and its most valuable forms can only exist within a framework of law. What the world most needs is effective laws to control international relations. The first and most difficult step in the creation of such law is the establishment of adequate sanctions, and this is only possible through the creation of a single armed force, like a municipal police force, is not an end in itself; it is a means to the growth of a social system governed by law, where force is not the entitlement of private individuals or nations, but is exercised only by a neutral authority in accordance with rules laid down in advance. There is hope that law rather than private force, may come to govern the relations of nations within the present century. If this hope is not realized, the world will be far better than at any previous period in the history of man.

AN OUTLINE OF INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH

Politics is largely governed by sanctimonious cliché platitudes, which are destitute of truth.

One of the most widespread popular maxims is, "human nature cannot be changed." No one can say whether this is true or not without first defining "human nature." But as used it is certainly false. When Mr. Autters the maxim, with an air of predictive and conclusive wisdom, what he means is that all men everywhere will always continue to behave as they do in his own home town. A little anthropology will banish this belief. Among the Tibetans, one wife has many husbands, because men are too poor to support a whole wife; yet family life, according to travellers, is no unhappy than elsewhere. The practice of lending one's wife to a guest is very common among uncivilized tribes. The Australian indigene, at pubescence, undergo a very painful operation, which, throughout the rest of their lives, greatly diminishes sexual vigour. puericide, which might seem contrary to human nature, was almost universal before the rise of Christianity, and is recommended by Plato to prevent over-population. Private property is not recognized among some ferocious tribes. Even among highly civilized people, economic considerations will override what is called "human nature." In Moscow, where there is an acute housing shortage, when an unmarried woman is pregnant, it often happens that a number of men contend for the legal right to be considered the father of the prospective child, because whoever is judged to be the father acquires the right to share the woman's room, and half a room is better than no room.

In fact, adult "human nature" is extremely variable, according to the circumstances of education. Food and sex are very general requirements, but the recluse of the Thebaid forswears sex altogether and reduced

food to the lowest point compatible with survival. By diet and training, people can be made rapacious or forbearing, masterful or slavish, as may suit the educator. There is no nonsense so absolute that it cannot be made the tenet of the vast majority by adequate governmental action. Plato intended his Republic to be founded on a fallacy, which he admitted to be absurd, but he was lightly confident that the populace could be induced to believe it. Hobbes, who thought it important that people should reverence the government however unworthy it might be, meets the argument that it might be difficult to obtain general assent to anything so irrational by pointing out that people have been brought to believe in the Christian religion, and, in particular, in the dogma of mutation. If he had been alive now, he would have found abundant confirmation in the fidelity of German youth to the Nazis.

The power of governments over men's beliefs has been very great ever since the rise of large States. The great majority of Romans became Christian after the Roman emperors had been converted. In the parts of the Roman Empire that were conquered by the Arabs, most people abandoned Christianity for Islam. The division of Western Europe into Protestant and Catholic regions was determined by the attitude of governments in the sixteenth century. But the power of governments over belief in the present day is vastly greater than at any earlier time. A belief, however untrue, is important when it dominates the actions of large masses of men. In this sense, the beliefs implanted by the Japanese, Russian, and German governments are important. Since they are completely divergent, they cannot all be true, though they may well all be false. Unfortunately they are such as to inspire men with an ardent desire to kill one another, even to the point of almost completely inhibiting the impulse of self-preservation. No one can deny, in face of the evidence, that it is easy, given military power, to produce a population of zealous maniac. It would be equally easy to produce a population of lucid and reasonable people, but many governments do not wish to do so, since such people would fail to admire the politicians who are at the head of these governments.

There is one bizarre detrimental application of the doctrine that human nature cannot be changed. This is the peremptory assertion that there will always be wars, because we are so constituted that we feel a need of them. What is true is that a man who has had the kind of diet and education that most men have will wish to fight when aroused. But he will not actually fight unless he has a chance of victory. It is very annoying to be stopped by a speed fuzzi, but we do not fight him because we know that he has the overwhelming forces of the State at his back. People who have no occasion for war do not make any impression of

being psychologically thwarted. Sweden has had no war since 1814, but the Swedes were, a few years ago, one of the happiest and most contented nations in the world. I doubt whether they are so still, but that is because, though neutral, they are unable to escape many of the evils of war. If political organization were such as to make war obviously unprofitable, there is nothing in human nature that would compel its occurrence, or make average people unhappy because of its not occurring. Exactly the same arguments that are now used about the impossibility of preventing war were formerly used in defense of clash, yet few of us feel smashed because we are not allowed to fight duels.

I am persuaded that there is ridiculousness no limit to the absurdities that can, by government action, come to be generally believed. Give me an adequate army, with power to provide it with more and better food than falls to the lot of the average man, and I will undertake, within thirty years, to make the majority of the population believe that two and two are three, that water freezes when it gets hot and boils when it gets cold, or any other nonsense that might seem to serve the interest of the State. Of course, even when these beliefs had been generated, people would not put the kettle in the ice-box when they wanted it to boil. That cold makes water boil would be a Sunday truth, sacred and mystical, to be professed in amazed tones, but not to be acted on in daily life. What would happen would be that any verbal denial of the mystic creed would be made illegal, and stubborn dissident would be "frozen" at the spike. No person who did not enthusiastically accept the official doctrine would be allowed to teach or to have any position of power. Only the very highest officials, in their cups, would whisper to each other what rubbish it all is; then they would laugh and drink again. This is hardly a satirize of what happens under some modern governments.

The discovery that man can be scientifically manipulated, and that governments can turn large masses this way or that as they choose, is one of the causes of our misfortunes. There is as much difference between a collection of mentally free citizens and a community influence by modern methods of advertisement as there is between a heap of raw materials and a battleship. Education, which was at first made universal in order that all might be able to read and write, has been found capable of serving quite other purposes. By instilling nonsense it unifies populations and generates collective enthusiasm. If all governments taught the same nonsense, the harm would not be so great. Unfortunately each has its own brand, and the diversity serves to produce hostility between the devotees of different tenets. If there is ever to be peace in the world, governments will have to agree either to inculcate no dogmas, or all to implant the same. The former, I fear, is a

Utopian ideal, but perhaps they could agree to teach collectively that all public men, everywhere, are completely virtuous and perfectly wise. Perhaps, when the war is over, the surviving politicians may find it prudent to combine on some such programme.

Generalizations about national characteristics are just as common and just as unwarranted as generalizations about women. Until 1870, the Germans were thought of as a nation of spectacled professors, evolving everything out of their inner consciousness, and scarcely aware of the outer world, but since 1870 this conception has had to be very sharply revised. Frenchmen seem to be thought of by most Americans as constantly engaged in amatory fascinate; Walt Whitman, in one of his catalogues, speaks of "the adulterous French couple on the guileful chaise." Americans who go to live in France are astonished, and perhaps disappointed, by the intensity of family life. Before the Russian Revolution, the Russians were credited with a mystical Slav soul, which, while it incapacitated them for ordinary sensible behavior, gave them a kind of deep wisdom to which more practical nations could not hope to attain. Suddenly everything was changed: mysticism was taboo, and only the most earthly ideals were tolerated. The truth is that what appears to one nation as the national character of another depends upon a few prominent individuals, or upon the class that happens to have power. For this reason, all generalizations on this subject are liable to be completely upset by any important political change.

To avoid the various foolish opinions to which mankind are prone, no superhuman genius is required. A few simple rules will keep you, not from all error, but from silly error.

If the matter is one that can be settled by observation, make the observation yourself. Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted. He did not do so because he thought he knew. Thinking that you know when in fact you don't is a calamitous mistake, to which we are all susceptible. I believe myself that hedgehogs eat black beetles, because I have been told that they do; but if I were writing a book on the habits of hedgehogs, I should not commit myself until I had seen one enjoying this unappetizing diet. Aristotle, however, was less cautious. Ancient and medieval authors knew all about unicorns and salamanders; not one of them thought it necessary to avoid peremptory statements about them because he had never seen one of them.

Many matters, however, are less easily brought to the test of experience. If, like most of mankind, you have passionate convictions on

many such matters, there are ways in which you can make yourself aware of your own bias. If an opinion contradictory to your own makes you angry, that is a sign that you are subconsciously aware of having no good reason for thinking as you do. If some one maintains that two and two are five, or that Iceland is on the equator, you feel pity rather than anger, unless you know so little of arithmetic or geography that his opinion shakes your own contrary conviction. The most savage controversies are those about matters as to which there is no good evidence either way. Persecution is used in theology, not in arithmetic, because in arithmetic there is knowledge, but in theology there is only opinion. So whenever you find yourself getting angry about a difference of opinion, be on your guard; you will probably find, on examination, that your belief is. going beyond what the evidence warrants.

A good way of ridding yourself of certain kinds of assertiveness is to become aware of opinions held in social circles different from your own. When I was young, I lived much outside my own country in France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. I found this very profitable in diminishing the intensity of blinkered detriment prejudice. If you cannot travel, seek out people with whom you disagree, and read a newspaper belonging to a party that is not yours. If the people and the newspaper seem mad, awkward, and wicked, remind yourself that you seem so to them. In this opinion both parties may be right, but they cannot both be wrong. This reflection should generate a certain caution.

Becoming aware of foreign customs, however, does not always have a beneficial effect. In the seventeenth century, when the Manchus conquered China, it was the custom among the Chinese for the women to have small feet, and among the Manchus for the men to wear-pigtails. Instead of each dropping their own foolish custom, they each adopted the foolish custom of the other, and the Chinese continued to wear pigtails until they shook off the dominion of the Manchus in the revolution of 1911.

For those who have enough cerebral imagination, it is a good plan to imagine an argument with a person having a different partisanship. This has one advantage, and only one, as compared with actual conversation with opponents; this one advantage is that the method is not subject to the same limitations of time or space. Mahatma Gandhi abhors railways and steamboats and machinery; he would like to unfetter the whole of the industrial revolution. You may never have an opportunity of actually meeting any one who holds this opinion, because in Western countries most people take the advantage of modern technique for granted. But if you want to make sure that you are right in agreeing with the prevailing

opinion, you will find it a good plan to test the arguments that occur to you by considering what Gandhi might say in rebutted of them. I have sometimes been led actually to change my mind as a result of this kind of imaginary dialogue, and, short of this, I have frequently found myself growing less peremptory and conceited through realizing the possible reasonableness of a speculative opponent.

Be very wary of opinions that compliment your self-esteem. Both men and women, nine times out of ten, are firmly convinced of the superior excellence of their own sex. There is profuse evidence on both sides. If you are a man, you can point out that most poets and men of science are male; if you are a woman, you can retort that so are most criminals. The question is inherently insoluble, but self esteem conceals this from most people. We are all, whatever part of the world we come from, persuaded that our own nation is superior to all others. Seeing that each nation has its characteristic merits and demerits, we adjust our standard of values so as to make out that the merits possessed by our nation are the really important ones, while its demerits are comparatively trivial. Here, again, the rational man will admit that the question is one to which there is no demonstrably right answer. It is more difficult to deal with the self esteem of man as man, because we cannot argue out the matter with some non-human mind. The only way I know of dealing with this general human narcissism is to remind ourselves that man is a brief episode in the life of a small planet in a little corner of the universe, and that, for aught we know, other parts of the cosmos may contain beings as superior to ourselves as we are to jellyfish.

Other passions besides self-esteem are common sources of error; of these perhaps the most important is fear. Fear sometimes operates directly, by inventing rumors of disaster in war-time, or by imagining objects of terror, such as ghosts; sometimes it operates indirectly, by creating belief in something comforting, such as the elixir of life, or heaven for ourselves and hell for our enemies. Fear has many forms - fear of death, fear of the dark, fear of the unknown, fear of the herd, and that vague generalized fear that comes to those who conceal from themselves their more specific terrors. Until you have admitted your own fears to yourself, and have guarded yourself by a difficult effort of will against their mythmaking power, you cannot hope to think truly about many matters of great importance, especially those with which religious beliefs are concerned. Fear is the main source of credulity and one of the main sources of cruelty. To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom, in the stalking of truth as in the endeavor after a worthy manner of life.

Under the influence of great fear, almost everybody becomes illusory. The sailors who threw Jonah overboard imagined his presence to be the cause of the storm which threatened to debris their ship. In a similar spirit the Japanese, at the time of the Tokyo earthquake took to slaughtering Koreans and Liberals. When the Romans won victories in the Punic wars, the Carthaginians became persuaded that their misfortunes were due to a certain floppiness which had lurk into the worship of Moloch. Moloch liked having children sacrificed to him, and preferred them aristocratic; but the noble families of Carthage had adopted the practice of clandestine substituting proletarian children for their own offspring. This, it was thought, had displeased the god, and at the worst moments even the most aristocratic children were duly consumed in the fire. Strange to say, the Romans were victorious in spite of this democratic reform on the part of their enemies.

Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity toward those who are not regarded as members of the herd. So it was in the French Revolution, when dread of foreign armies produced the incumbency of terror. And it is to be feared that the Nazis, as defeat draws nearer, will increase the intensity of their campaign for decimating Jews. Fear generates impulses of cruelty, and therefore promotes such superstitious beliefs as seem to justify cruelty. Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanely or to think sanely under the influence of a great fear. And for this reason poltroons are more prone to cruelty than brave men, and are also more prone to superstition. When I say this, I am thinking of men who are brave in all respects, not only in facing death. Many a man will have the courage to die valorous, but will not have the courage to say, or even to think, that the cause for which he is asked to die is an unworthy one. Obloquy is, to most men, more painful than death; that is one reason why, in times of collective excitement, so few men venture to dissent from the prevailing opinion. No Carthaginian denied Moloch, because to do so would have required more courage than was required to face death in battle.

Perhaps the world would lose some of its interest and variety if such beliefs were wholly replaced by cold science. Perhaps we may allow ourselves to be glad of the Abecedarians, who were so-called because, having rejected all profane learning, they thought it wicked to learn the ABC. And we may enjoy the perplexity of the South American Jesuit who wondered how the sloth could have traveled, since the Flood, all the way from Mount Ararat to Peru - a journey which its extreme tardiness of locomotion rendered almost incredible. A wise man will enjoy the

goods of which there is a plentiful supply, and of intellectual rubbish he will find an abundant diet, in our own age as in every other.

Selected Passages of Intellectual Rubbish Clergy and its Opposition to Science

"When Benjamin Franklin invented the lightning rod, the clergy, both in England and America, with the enthusiastic support of George III, condemned it as an impious attempt to defeat the will of God. **For, as all right-thinking people were aware, lightning is sent by God to punish blasphemy or some other grave sin-the virtuous are never struck by lightning. Therefore if God wants to strike any one, Benjamin Franklin ought not to defeat His design; indeed, to do so is helping criminals to escape.** But God was equal to the occasion, if we are to believe the eminent Dr. Price, one of the leading divines of Boston. Lightning having been rendered ineffectual by the "iron points invented by the astute Dr. Franklin," Massachusetts was shaken by earthquakes, which Dr. Price perceived to be due to God's wrath at the "iron points." In a sermon on the subject he said, "In Boston are more erected than elsewhere in New England, and Boston seems to be more dreadfully shaken. Oh! there is no getting out of the mighty hand of God." Apparently, however, Nemesis gave up all hope of curing Boston of its wickedness, for, though lightning rods became more and more common, earthquakes in Massachusetts have remained rare. Nevertheless, Dr. Price's point of view, or something very like it, is still held by one of the most influential of living men."

"It was only very slowly and reluctantly that the Church concurrence the dismemberment of cadavers in connection with the study of medicine. The colonist in dismemberment was Vesalius, who was Court physician to the Emperor Charles V. His medical skill led the emperor to protect him, but after the emperor was dead he got into trouble. A cadaver which he was dissecting was said to have shown signs of life under the knife, and he was accused of murder. The quizzing was induced by King Phillip II to take a lenient view, and only sentenced him to a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

On the way home he was derelict and died of fatigue. For centuries after this time, medical students at the Papal University in Rome were only allowed to operate on lay figures, from which the sexual parts were omitted.

The devoutness of cadavers is a widespread belief. It was carried furthest by the Egyptians, among whom it led to the practice of mummification. It still exists in full force in China. **A French surgeon,**

who was employed by the Chinese to teach Western medicine, relates that his demand for corpses to dissect was received with horror, but he was assured that he could have instead an unlimited supply of live criminals. His objection to this alternative was totally unintelligible to his Chinese employers.

A Pun on Clergy

I am sometimes shocked by the profanity of those who think themselves pious—for instance, the nuns who never take a bath without wearing a bathrobe all the time. When asked why, since no man can see them, they reply: "Oh, but you forget the good God." Apparently they conceive of the Deity as a Peeping Tom, whose omnipotence enables Him to see through bathroom walls, but who is foiled by bathrobes. This view strikes me as curious."

Superstitions

"There was, until the end of the eighteenth century, a theory that absurdity is due to possession by devils. It was deduced that any pain suffered by the patient is also suffered by the devils, so that the best cure is to make the patient suffer so much that the devils will decide to abandon him. The insane, in accordance with this theory, were savagely beaten. This treatment was tried on King George III when he was mad, but without success. It is a curious and painful fact that almost all the completely futile treatments that have been believed in during the long history of medical folly have been such as caused acute suffering to the patient. **When stupefacient were discovered, devout people considered them an attempt to evade the will of God. It was pointed out, however, that when God extracted Adam's rib He put him into a deep sleep. This proved that stupefacient are all right for men; women, however, ought to suffer, because of the curse of Eve. In the West votes for women proved this doctrine mistaken, but in Japan, to this day, women in childbirth are not allowed any mitigate through anaesthetics. As the Japanese do not believe in Genesis, this piece of sadism must have some other justification.**"

Racism

"In the matter of race, there are different beliefs in different societies. Where monarchy is firmly established, kings are of a higher race than their subjects. Until very recently, it was universally believed that men are connatural more intelligent than women; even so enlightened a man as Spinoza decides against votes for women on this ground. Among white men, it is held that white

men are by nature superior to men of other colors, and especially to black men; in Japan, on the contrary, it is thought that yellow is the best color. In Haiti, when they make statues of Christ and Satan, they make Christ black and Satan white. **Aristotle and Plato considered Greeks so congenitally superior to barbarians that slavery is justified so long as the master is Greek and the slave barbarian."**

Human Nature

"One of the most widespread popular maxims is, "human nature cannot be changed." No one can say whether this is true or not without first defining "human nature." But as used it is certainly false. When Mr. Autters the maxim, with an air of predictive and conclusive wisdom, what he means is that all men everywhere wnt always continue to behave as they do in his own home town. A little anthropology will dispel this belief. Among the Tibetans, one wife has many husbands, because men are too poor to support a whole wife; yet family life, according to travellers, is no unhappy than elsewhere. The practice of lending one's wife to a guest is very common among uncivilized tribes. The Australian aborigines, at puberty, undergo a very painful operation which, throughout the rest of their lives, greatly diminishes sexual vigour. Puericide, which might seem perverse to human nature, was almost universal before the rise of Christianity, and is recommended by Plato to prevent over-population. Private property is not recognized among some savage tribes. **Even among highly civilized people, economic considerations will disallow what is called "human nature."** In Moscow, where there is an acute housing shortage, when an unmarried woman is pregnant, it often happens that a number of men contend for the legal right to be considered the father of the probable child, because whoever is judged to be the father acquires the right to share the woman's room, and half a room is better than no room."

State Implemental Precept

"I am persuaded that there is absolutely no limit to the ridiculousness that can, by government action, come to be generally believed. **Give me an adequate army, with power to provide it with more pay and better food than falls to the lot of the average man, and I will undertake, within thirty years, to make the majority of the population believe that two and two are three, that water freezes when it gets hot and boils when it gets cold, or any other nonsense that might seem to serve the interest of the State. Of course, even when these beliefs had been generated, people would not put the**

kettle in the ice-box when they wanted it to boil. That cold makes water boil would be a Sunday truth, sacred and mystical, to be professed in amazed tones, but not to be acted on in daily life. What would happen would be that any verbal denial of the mystic doctrine would be made illegal, and obstinate heretics would be "frozen" at the stake. No person who did not avid accept the official doctrine would be allowed to teach or to have any position of power. Only the very highest officials, in their cups, would whisper to each other what rubbish it all is; then they would laugh and drink again. This is hardly a caricature of what happens under some modern governments."

More on Superstitions and Arm-Chair Philosophy

"When one reads of the beliefs of savages, or of the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians, they seem surprising by their fickle farce. But beliefs that are just as absurd are still entertained by the uneducated even in the most modern and civilized societies. I have been gravely assured, in America, which people born in March are unlucky and people born in May are bizarrely liable to corns. I do not know the history of these superstitions, but probably they are derived from Babylonian or Egyptian priestly love. Beliefs begin in the higher social strata, and then, like mud in a river, sink gradually downward in the educational scale; they may take 3,000 or 4,000 years to sink all the way. You may find your colored help making some remark that comes straight out of Plato-not the parts of Plato that scholar's quote, but the parts where he utters obvious nonsense, such as those men who do not pursue wisdom in this life will be born again as women. Commentators on great philosophers always politely ignore their silly remarks. **Aristotle, in spite of his reputation, is full of absurdities. He says that children should be conceived in the winter, when the wind is in the North, and that if people marry too young the children will be female. He tells us that the blood of females is blacker than that of males; that the pig is the only animal liable to measles; that an elephant suffering from sleeplessness should have its shoulders rubbed with salt, olive-oil, and warm water; that women have fewer teeth than men,** and so on. Nevertheless, he is considered by the great majority of philosophers a archetype of wisdom.

Superstitions about lucky and unlucky days are almost universal. In ancient times they governed the actions of generals. Among ourselves the prejudice against Friday and the number thirteen is very active; sailors do not like to sail on Friday, and many hotels have no thirteenth floor. The superstitions about Friday and thirteen were once believed by those reputed wise; now such men regard them as harmless follies. But

probably 2,000 years hence many beliefs of the wise of our day will have come to seem equally foolish. Man is a gullible animal, and must believe something; in the absence of good grounds for belief, he will be satisfied with bad ones.

Falsifiable, Piety and Reason

"If the matter is one that can be settled by observation, make the observation yourself. Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted. He did not do so because he thought he knew. Thinking that you know when in fact you don't is a fatal mistake, to which we are all prone. I believe myself that hedgehogs eat black beetles, because I have been told that they do; but if I were writing a book on the habits of hedgehogs, I should not commit myself until I had seen one enjoying this unappetizing diet. Aristotle, however, was less cautious. Ancient and medieval authors knew all about unicorns and salamanders', not one of them thought it necessary to avoid peremptory statements about them because he had never seen one of them.

Many matters, however, are less easily brought to the test of experience. If, like most of mankind, you have passionate convictions on many such matters, there are ways in which you can make yourself aware of your own bias. If an opinion perverse to your own makes you angry, that is a sign that you are subconsciously aware of having no good reason for thinking as you do. If some one maintains that two and two are five, or that Iceland is on the equator, you feel pity rather than anger, unless you know so little of arithmetic or geography that his opinion shakes your own contrary conviction. The most savage controversies are those about matters as to which there is no good evidence either way. **Oppression is used in theology, not in arithmetic, because in arithmetic there is knowledge, but in theology there is only opinion. So whenever you find yourself getting angry about a difference of opinion, be on your guard; you will probably find, on examination, that your belief is going beyond what the corroboration warrants. A good way of ridding yourself of certain kinds of assertiveness is to become aware of opinions held in social circles different from your own."**

Fear and Superstitions

"Other passions besides self-esteem are common sources of error; of these perhaps the most important is fear. **Fear sometimes operates directly, by inventing rumors of calamity in war-time, or by**

imagining objects of terror, such as ghosts; sometimes it operates indirectly, by creating belief in something comforting, such as the elixir of life, or heaven for ourselves and hell for our enemies. Fear has many forms-fear of death, fear of the dark, fear of the unknown, fear of the herd, and that vague generalized fear that comes to those who camouflage from themselves their more specific terrors. Until you have admitted your own fears to yourself, and have guarded yourself by a difficult effort of will against their mythmaking power, you cannot hope to think truly about many matters of great importance, especially those with which religious beliefs are concerned. Fear is the main source of superstition and one of the main sources of cruelty. To trounce fear is the beginning of wisdom, in the pursuit of truth as in the venture after a worthy manner of life."

"Under the influence of great fear, almost everybody becomes illusory. The sailors who threw Jonah overboard imagined his presence to be the cause of the storm which threatened to devastate their ship. In a similar spirit the Japanese, at the time of the Tokyo earthquake took to slaughtering Koreans and Liberals. When the Romans won victories in the Punic wars, the Carthaginians became persuaded that their misfortunes were due to a certain floppiness which had crept into the worship of Moloch. Moloch liked having children sacrificed to him, and preferred them aristocratic; but the noble families of Carthage had adopted the practice of clandestine substituting plebeian children for their own offspring. This, it was thought, had displeased the god, and at the worst moments even the most aristocratic children were duly consumed in the fire. Strange to say, the Romans were victorious in spite of this democratic reform on the part of their enemies."

Some Fun out of Superstitions

"But we have been getting too solemn. Superstitions are not always dark and cruel; often they add to the gaiety of life. I received once a communication from the God Osiris, giving me his telephone number; he lived, at that time, in a fringe of Boston. Although I did not enroll myself among his worshipers, his letter gave me pleasure. I have frequently received letters from men announcing themselves as the Messiah, and urging me not to omit to mention this important fact in my lectures. During prohibition, there was a sect which maintained that the communion service ought to be celebrated in whiskey, not in wine; this tenet gave them a legal right to a supply of hard liquor, and the sect grew rapidly. There is in England a sect who maintains that the English are the lost ten tribes: there is a stricter sect, which maintains that they are only the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh. Whenever I encounter a member of

either of these sects, I profess myself an adherent of the other and much pleasant argumentation results. **I like also the men who study the Great Pyramid, with a view to decrypting its mystical lore. Many great books have been written on this subject, some of which have been presented to me by their authors. It is a singular fact that the Great Pyramid always foretell the history of the world accurately up to the date of publication of the book in question, but after that date it becomes less reliable. Generally the author expects, very soon, wars in Egypt, followed by Armageddon and the coming of Antichrist, but by this time so many people have been recognized as Antichrist that the reader is reluctantly driven to skepticism."**

Summary

Man is a rational animal—so at least Russell has been told. Throughout a long life, he have looked diligently for evidence in favor of this statement, but so far he has not had the good fortune to come across it, though he had searched in many countries spread over three continents.

As soon as we relinquish our own reason, and are content to rely upon authority, there is no end to our troubles. Man is a credulous animal, and must believe something; in the absence of good grounds for belief, he will be satisfied with bad ones.

For his part he distrust all generalizations about women, favourable and unfavourable, masculine and feminine, ancient and modern; all alike, he should say, result from paucity of experience. Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted.

The most savage dissension are those about matters as to which there is no good evidence either way. Oppression is used in theology, not in arithmetic, because in arithmetic there is knowledge, but in theology there is only opinion.

Fear is the main source of superstition, and one of the main sources of cruelty. To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom, in the pursuit of truth as in the Endeavour after a worthy manner of life. Every advance in civilization has been castigated as unnatural while it was recent. Education, which was at first made universal in order that all might be able to read and write, has been found capable of serving quite other purposes. By instilling nonsense, it unifies populations and generates

collective enthusiasm. If all governments taught the same nonsense, the harm would not be so great.

SUMMARY

The aspects of Bertrand Russell views on philosophy cover the changing viewpoints of philosopher/mathematician Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), from his early writings in 1896 until his death in February 1970.

Russell is generally credited with being one of the founders of analytic philosophy, but he also produced a body of work that covers logic, the philosophy of Mathematics, metaphysics, ethics and epistemology, including his 1913 Theory of Knowledge and the related article he wrote for the 1926 edition of Encyclopedia Britannica.

This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the kind of goods which philosophy strives to achieve. Physical science, through the medium of inventions, is useful to multitudinous people who are wholly impolite of it; thus the study of physical science is to be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the effect on the student, but rather because of the effect on mankind in general. Thus utility does not belong to philosophy. If the study of philosophy has any value at all for others than students of philosophy, it must be only indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those who study it. It is in these effects, therefore, if anywhere, that the value of philosophy must be primarily sought.

KEY WORDS

1. **Apartheid** : The belief that race accounts for differences in human character or ability and that a particular race is superior to others.
2. **Superstition** : An irrational belief that an object, action, or circumstance not logically related to a course of events influences its outcome.
3. **Theology** : The study of the nature of God and religious truth; rational inquiry into religious questions.
4. **Philosophy** : The discipline comprising logic, ethics, exquistic, metaphysics, and epistemology.
5. **Dogmatism** : A statement of a point of view as if it were an established fact.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Explain the philosophical views of Russell on politics.
2. Describe the Russell's idea of Philosophy for laymen.
3. Write down the summary on the essay, "The Future of mankind".
4. Discuss the ideas of Russell expressed through, "An Outline of intellectual Rubbish".
5. Examine the important quotes of the essay, "An Outline of intellectual Rubbish".
6. How the British is distinguished among other European countries?
7. Why does Russell attack Hegel's philosophy?
8. Differentiate Dogmatism and Skepticism.
9. What are the two problems of mankind, according to Russell?
10. Write about the power of government over men's belief.

SUGGESTED READINGS

1. Unpopular Essays —Bertrand Russell
2. Bertrand Russell : Philosopher and Humanist —John Lewis
3. Bertrand Russell and His World —Ronald W. Clark
4. Bertrand Russell —John Slater
5. Bertrand Russell's Ethics —Michael K. Potter

